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Editor’s Note: This essay is based on a presentation Professor Lonnie 
Brown made at the 2008 Ethics Centennial Symposium sponsored by 
the American Bar Association’s Section of Litigation. The symposium 
was in honor of the 100-year anniversary of the ABA’s 1908 Canons of 
Professional Ethics. Brown is deeply appreciative of 2008 Georgia Law 
alumna Kerrie Howze’s invaluable research assistance on this project.
he practice of litigators 
making impassioned 
public statements about 
their clients and cases 
has become almost 
a routine or expected part of 
any remotely high-profile mat-
ter. This is particularly so in 
the context of criminal 
prosecutions. 
Defense attorneys 
and prosecutors alike 
seem to relish the 
opportunity to posture and pontificate before the court 
of public opinion, issuing soundbites that might very well 
elicit a stern rebuke if uttered in the actual courtroom. 
Here are a few noteworthy examples on the prosecution 
side.
First, Wayne County, Mich., District Attorney Kym 
Worthy made the following statement in support of her 
decision to indict former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick 
on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in relation 
to his alleged cover-up of an affair with his former chief of 
staff: “Our investigation has clearly shown that public dol
lars were used, people’s lives were ruined, the justice system 
was severely mocked and the public trust trampled on. … 
This is as far from being a private matter as one can get.”
In addition, in reference to Kilpatrick’s perjury charge, 
Worthy stated: “Even children know that lying is wrong. ... 
Lying (in court under oath) cannot be tolerated even if a 
judge and jury see through it.”2
Another recent public statement of note was made by 
District of Columbia U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor regarding the con-
clusion of the investigation into the deadly 2001 anthrax mailings. 
Shortly after the death of principal suspect Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, 
Taylor confidently proclaimed Ivins’ guilt – “We stand here today, 
firmly convinced that we have the person who committed those 
attacks. … And we are confident that, had this gone to trial, we 
would have proved him [Ivins] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”3
While Taylor carefully emphasized what he deemed to be 
extraordinary circumstances justifying the public disclosure of 
evidence regarding an uncharged suspect,4 statements such as his 
and Worthy’s have become increasingly common in high-profile 
prosecutions.5
Not even renowned Chicago federal prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald 
could resist the urge to editorialize in announcing the government’s 
criminal complaint against former Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich, 
sharply observing that “[Blagojevich’s] conduct would make Lincoln 
roll over in his grave.”6





their penchant for the soapbox, their unique 
position within our judicial system as so-
called “ministers of justice”7 makes their 
extrajudicial commentary potentially 
more problematic, particularly in light 
of a criminal 
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defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Nevertheless, within the context uttered, none of the aforemen-
tioned examples arguably ran afoul of the current Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. This, however, plainly would not have been 
the case 100 years ago. At that time, extrajudicial advocacy of this 
sort would have provoked widespread condemnation from members 
of the bar because the appropriate response by a lawyer to a media 
inquiry was, simply put, “no comment.”8
Specifically, the American Bar Association’s first codification 
of ethical precepts for lawyers – the 1908 Canons of Professional 
Ethics9 – included a rigid proscription concerning public commen-
tary by attorneys in Canon 20:
“Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated 
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise 
prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be 
condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a 
statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. 
An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation 
from the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme 
cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.”10
While this canon, like the others, was largely aspirational, lack-
ing any meaningful regulatory bite,11 it still sent the unmistakable 
message that posturing before the court of public opinion was an 
unseemly practice that lawyers should avoid.
In the intervening 100 years an awful lot has obviously changed 
in terms of the bar’s articulated attitude towards extrajudicial com-
mentary. The profession has evolved from a regulatory culture of “no 
comment” to one of “anything goes,” or at least “almost anything 
goes.” 
Though there are admittedly ethical restrictions concerning this 
type of conduct, they are ambiguous, readily evaded and infre-
quently enforced.
Under the ABA’s current Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
to which most states adhere in substantial part, Canon 20 has been 
replaced with two separate rules – Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f). 
Rule 3.6(a) provides that: “A lawyer 
who is participating or has par-
ticipated in the investigation or 
litigation of a matter shall not 
make [a publicly disseminated] extrajudicial statement that the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know will … have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 
matter.”12
Although, the “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding” standard has been held constitutional by 
the Supreme Court,13 it remains a somewhat vague and indefinite 
measure. As a result, it is likely to ensnare only those whose com-
munications are particularly outlandish and central to a case.14
Furthermore, the difficulty of establishing “material prejudice” in 
this context is well-documented. 
In Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart,15 for example, the Supreme 
Court found that “even pervasive, adverse [pretrial] publicity does 
not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”16 Hence, it is extraordinarily 
challenging to predict that a particular communication is “substan-
tially likely” to cause “material prejudice,” and therefore, similarly 
arduous for disciplinary counsel to prove that an attorney issued a 
public comment with the requisite scienter.17
To compound the potential regulatory problem created by its 
blurry governing standard, Rule 3.6 also carves out a number of safe 
harbors for extrajudicial comment. 
Among the most significant is the exception for commentary 
regarding “information contained in a public record,”18 which frees 
lawyers to comment quite broadly on matters.
Another expansive loophole is the so-called “right of reply.”19
This provision expressly permits public statements that “a reasonable 
lawyer would believe [to be] required to protect a client from the 
substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated 
by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client.”20
While counsel is cautioned by the rule to exercise restraint in 
responding to adverse publicity,21 the “right of reply” creates the 
opportunity for a great deal of extrajudicial commentary.22 When 
combined with the provision allowing statements concerning 
“information contained in a public record,”23 there really seems to 
be little that attorneys cannot say. 
Indeed, even if their comments might otherwise contravene 
the malleable “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding” standard, lawyers may still be permitted to 
comment extrajudicially under these sub-sections.24
The other trial publicity rule – Rule 3.8(f) – is restricted to 
prosecutors, but is only intended to supplement Rule 3.6, not sup-
plant it.25
Hence, for the most part, the propriety of prosecutorial 
commentary about cases remains contingent upon wheth-
er or not the communication runs afoul of the pliable 
dictates of Model Rule 3.626 – i.e., whether the prosecutor 
knew or reasonably should have known the communica-
tion “[would] have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”27
This point is underscored by the ephemeral character 
of the purported “heightened” standard that Rule 3.8(f) 
imposes on prosecutors.
In particular, the general prohibition on prosecutors 
under the rule is with regard to “extrajudicial comments 
that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public 
condemnation of the accused.”28 What qualifies as 
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“public condemnation” and the requisite “heightening” thereof is 
by no means clear. 
If the public is sufficiently outraged over the heinous nature of 
an alleged offense, for example, it seems unrealistic to attempt to 
measure whether prosecutorial commentary has somehow increased 
the magnitude of communal indignation concerning the accused. It 
is akin to trying to determine who is “more dead” as between two 
deceased individuals.
To make matters worse from a regulatory standpoint, there are 
two broad areas of comment that are exempt under Rule 3.8(f), 
even if the statements are somehow deemed to have “heighten[ed] 
public condemnation of the accused.” 
First, the provision excepts from its proscription those “state-
ments that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and 
extent of the prosecutor’s action.” 
This window of permissible comment seems to afford prosecu-
tors significant room to communicate with the public. 
For instance, District Attorney Kym Worthy’s statements regard-
ing Kwame Kilpatrick’s perjury and obstruction of justice charges, 
noted earlier,29 could be explained as necessary to enlighten the 
public as to the justification for prosecuting him for what some 
characterized as a private affair.
The second exception to the Rule 3.8(f) standard is even more 
pliant than the first. It seems to permit any prosecutorial statement, 
no matter how inflammatory, that “serve[s] a legitimate law enforce-
ment purpose.”30 
One broad justification for communicating in this manner 
might be to keep the public adequately informed about the status of 
a case, an explanation that seems to cover comments such as those 
issued by U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor with respect to the investiga-
tion of the 2001 anthrax matter. 
In fact, it is difficult to imagine a prosecutorial statement con-
cerning any investigation or pending matter that could not some-
how be justified or rationalized under this exception. 
Moreover, besides Rule 3.8(f)’s ambiguous standard and gaping 
exceptions, it is further emasculated by Rule 3.6’s safe harbors and 
loopholes which appear to apply with equal force to prosecutors.31
In short, there is considerable wiggle room within the ethical 
rules for both defense attorneys and prosecutors, thus facilitating the 
proliferation and escalation of extrajudicial advocacy. 
But, “Why (some may ask) is this a bad thing?” Maybe the rule 
drafters got it right by allowing for greater public commentary by 
lawyers. 
After all, it can serve to educate or protect the public, in addition 
to being a powerful adversarial tool in a litigator’s arsenal. 
Furthermore, courts have the ability to rein in some of this 
behavior through the imposition of gag orders if deemed necessary.
Be that as it may, the expanding prevalence of bold, extrajudicial 
proclamations by lawyers on such points as the inevitability of con-
viction or acquittal have the potential to irreparably skew the pub-
lic’s perception of the profession and the justice system as a whole. 
Indeed, the quantity and nature of this sort of attorney speech is 
enough to inspire nostalgic yearning for a return to the days of “no 
comment,” when lawyers tried their cases in the courtroom rather 
than on the courthouse steps. 
Unfortunately, in current times, “no comment” is synonymous 
with an admission or concession as to whatever negative conclusion 
a listener can draw. In addition, there are certainly situations where 
some manner of extrajudicial comment is undeniably proper, and 
conceivably even required. 
Although resurrecting the “no comment” standard of old would 
be impractical, the same cannot be said about the lofty goals and 
principles that ostensibly inspired this norm and others more than 
100 years ago. 
In enacting the canons, the ABA’s articulated objective was the 
cultivation of a system that was “pure and unsullied” through the 
exhibition of professional conduct and motives that would gener-
ate “absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality” of the 
administration of justice, and ultimately enhance the overall image 
and reputation of the profession.32
High-profile cases, such as the one against former Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich, often 
result in attorneys taking their advocacy to the court of public opinion. Photo courtesy of 
The Washington Times.
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Unfortunately, in current times, “no comment” is synonymous with  
an admission or concession as to whatever negative conclusion a listener can 
draw. In addition, there are certainly situations where some manner of  
extrajudicial comment is undeniably proper, and conceivably even required. 
The questionable behavior of many modern day extrajudicial 
advocates tends to have quite the opposite effect. Consequently, 
these lawyers must be compelled to chin to a higher standard, one 
more consistent with the proffered intent behind the 1908 Canons. 
Proper areas for attorney commentary should accordingly be re-
crafted with such first principles in mind. 
Along these lines, one possibility might be to per-
mit only statements intended to: (1) assist in the mainte-
nance of public accountability with regard to the legal system; 
(2) protect the public from potential harm; or (3) educate the public 
about the substance and procedure of legal proceedings. 
Textual support for limiting permissible public comment in this 
fashion can be found in Comment 1 to Model Rule 3.6, where it 
is noted that:
“[T]here are vital social interests served by the free dissemination 
of information about events having legal consequences and about 
legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about 
threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It 
also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, 
particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the 
subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in 
debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.”33
This unenforceable comment, which is largely overshadowed by 
the ambiguities and loopholes of Rule 3.6’s blackletter text, hearkens 
back to the public-oriented ideals associated with the original ABA 
Canons and should be accorded greater regulatory emphasis. 
There are undoubtedly other viable responses to the burgeoning 
practice of lawyers commenting publicly on pending matters. The 
critical point is that something needs to be done, and perhaps a 
retrospective view can provide the appropriate ethical lens through 
which to examine the problem.
Concededly, in order to effectuate positive change and achieve 
progress, it is frequently necessary to discard or discredit seemingly 
archaic ideals or modes of operation. But just because something 
may be categorized as old does not automatically qualify it as obso-
lete. 
A forward-looking view is not always the right perspective; as the 
saying goes, hindsight is 20/20. 
From my vantage point, on the subject of extrajudicial speech 
by lawyers, a thoughtful look backwards could very well foster an 
ethical step in the right direction.
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